NTRUSign is a lattice-based digital signature scheme proposed by Hoffstein et al. NTRUSign is quite different from many other signature schemes in a sense that its security depends on neither the integer factorization problem nor the discrete logarithm problem but on a geometric problem called the close vector searching problem. However, it is known that there is some vulnerability in NTRUSign, namely there is an attack called the transcript attack. In this paper, we propose a countermeasure for protecting NTRUSign against the transcript attack, and give an improved NTRUSign algorithm.
Introduction
NTRUSign [6, 7] is a digital signature scheme proposed by NTRU cryptosystems. NTRU is an abbreviation of ''Number TheoRists are Us''. It is one of the lattice-based cryptosystems [1, 5, 8, 9] . The scheme is in fact based on a geometric hard problem called the close vector searching problem on some lattices, whereas many other signature schemes are based on algebraic hard problems such as the integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem. In NTRUSign, each message is hashed into an integer vector of some large dimension, and its corresponding signature is a lattice point sufficiently close to the hashed message vector. The signing procedure is to solve the close vector searching problem in the special lattice, called the NTRU lattice. The private signing key is a basis of the NTRU lattice, and the public verification key is another basis of the same NTRU lattice. The verification procedure is to examine that the signature is sufficiently close to the hashed message vector using the public key.
Concerning the security of NTRUSign, it is known that there is some vulnerability in NTRUSign. Namely, there is an attack called the transcript attack [4] . The transcript attack is briefly described as follows. Assume that an attacker obtains a sample list consisting of pairs of message and its signature that are generated by a single private key. He then computes the ''transcript'' from the sample list in order to obtain some partial information of the private key. If the sample list is sufficiently long, then he could get the complete private key. The designers of NTRUSign propose the perturbation technique in order to avoid the transcript attack, which is briefly described as follows. If s is a signature vector of some message vector m, then any lattice vector sufficiently close to s is also a signature vector for m. Using this fact, the perturbation technique protects NTRUSign against the transcript attack by adding random small vectors to signatures [6, 7] .
In this paper, we propose a new countermeasure to protect NTRUSign against the transcript attack. It is quite different from the perturbation technique, and is based on the fact that there may be many private keys corresponding to a single public key. Our strategy is to increase the size of sample lists required for the transcript attack in a way that the signer updates his private keys before the attacker obtains a sufficiently long transcript generated by the current signing key. Our countermeasure thus improves the original NTRUSign in a sense that breaking the private key by the transcript attack is made harder. The way that the signer updates his private keys is similar to the forward secure signature scheme [3] . But our improved NTRUSign does not have the forward security, i.e. if an attacker obtains the latest private key, he may be possible to efficiently find the previous private keys.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe NTRUSign and define some notions and notations. We devote Section 3 to describe the transcript attack on NTRUSign. We propose in Section 4 a countermeasure for protecting NTRUSign against the transcript attack and analyze its efficacy. We give in Section 5 the concluding remarks.
Description of NTRUSign
In this section, we briefly describe NTRUSign and provide necessary definitions. Let N 2 N be a security parameter, and let R ¼ Z½X=ðX N À 1Þ be the residue class ring of the polynomial ring Z½X by the principal ideal ðX N À 1Þ generated by the polynomial X N À 1. Each polynomial aðXÞ ¼ P NÀ1 i¼0 a i X i 2 R is identified with an N-dimensional integer vector of its coefficients as follows:
Identifying each integer with a constant polynomial, Z is canonically viewed as a subring of R. The product of two polynomials aðXÞ ¼ P NÀ1 i¼0 a i X i 2 R and bðXÞ ¼ P NÀ1 i¼0 b i X i 2 R is denoted by a Ã b, and the coefficient of
The multiplication Ã is commutative by the definition. For any natural number q, set R q ¼ Z q ½X=ðX N À 1Þ, where Z q ¼ Z=qZ. Typically, the integer q is a prime or a power of prime. For any u; v 2 R and q 2 Z, u v (mod qÞ means that each coefficient of u À v is divisible by q, namely u ¼ v þ q f for some polynomial f 2 R. The multiplicative group of units in R q is denoted by R Ã q . The inverse of a polynomial a 2 R Ã q is denoted by a À1 . A polynomial a 2 R is said to be binary if all coefficients of a belong to the set f0; 1g.
For each x 2 R, bxe denotes the integer defined by
If a is a polynomial with real coefficients, bae denote the polynomial obtained by applying above operation to each coefficient of a.
NTRUSign is based on a lattice problem called the Close Vector Searching Problem (CVSP) in a special kind of lattices called the convolution modular lattices. The convolution modular lattice is defined as follows.
NÀ1 be a polynomial in R and q be a natural number. Then a convolution modular lattice L h;q by h and q is an R-submodule of R 2 given by
If h f À1 Ã g (mod qÞ for some polynomials f 2 R Ã q and g 2 R, then L h;q is called a NTRU lattice. Note that L h;q is a free R-module of rank 2 with a trivial R-basis fð1; hÞ; ð0; qÞg. If h f À1 Ã g (mod qÞ for some polynomials f 2 R Ã q and g 2 R, there exists some polynomials F 2 R and G 2 R such that fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg is an R-basis of L h;q . The close vector searching problem in the convolution modular lattices asks for a given point ðu; vÞ 2 R Â R and a rational radius r > 0, whether or not there exists a point ðs; tÞ in the convolution modular lattice L h;q such that the distance between ðs; tÞ and ðu; vÞ is less than or equal to r. We will hereafter use a distance based on a specific norm called the centered norm as defined below. Definition 2. Let aðXÞ ¼ P NÀ1 i¼0 a i X i be a polynomial in R. The centered norm kaðXÞk of aðXÞ is defined as the nonnegative real number satisfying
where a ¼ ð1=NÞ P NÀ1 i¼0 a i is the average of the coefficients of aðXÞ. The centered norm in a direct sum module R n is defined as the nonnegative real number satisfying
Definition 3. The close vector searching problem in the convolution modular lattices asks, for given instances h 2 R, q 2 N, a positive radius B 2 Q and a target point m 2 R 2 , to find a lattice point x 2 L h;q such that
where k Á k denotes the centered norm.
The close vector searching problem is slightly different from the famous lattice problem, the closest vector problem, in a sense that the closest vector problem asks to find the closest lattice point from a given input vector, while the close vector searching problem asks to find a lattice vector within a given radius that is not necessarily the closest one.
We are now ready to describe the algorithms in NTRUSign. NTRUSign is briefly outlined as follows. NTRUSign involves several system parameters and three algorithms, say the key generation, signing and verification algorithms. The key generation algorithm generates a public key h which gives a trivial R-basis fð1; hÞ; ð0; qÞg of L h;q , and a nontrivial R-basis fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg of L h;q as a corresponding private key. The signing algorithm hashes a given message D in order to transform the message into a point in R q Â R q . The algorithm computes a single hash value, and divides it into two vectors m 1 and m 2 which correspond to a point ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ 2 R q Â R q . It computes a lattice point ðs; tÞ that is close to the hashed message vector ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ using the private basis fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg, and outputs the first entry s as a signature for the message D. The verification algorithm recovers the second entry t of the lattice point ðs; tÞ using the public basis fð1; hÞ; ð0; qÞg, and examines whether or not the signature vector is sufficiently close to the hashed message vector.
A formal description of NTRUSign algorithms is as follows [6, 7] .
System Parameters. NTRUSign uses the following four system parameters:
1. N is a prime dimension; 2. q is a natural number used as a modulus; 3. d f and d g are nonnegative integers in the interval ½0; N used as a key size parameter; and 4. B is a positive rational number used as a verification norm bound parameter.
Key Generation Algorithm. The signer generates his private key fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg and the corresponding public key h.
INPUT: System parameters
2. GENERATE A PUBLIC KEY: (a) Choose two binary polynomials f 2 R Ã and g 2 R which have d f 1's and d g 1's in their coefficients, respectively; and
OUTPUT: Output fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg as a private key and h as a public key.
Signing Algorithm. The signer computes the signature s for a given message D. 
where the coefficients of A and a are chosen from the interval ½Àq=2; q=2. 4. FIND A CLOSE LATTICE POINT: Compute a lattice point ðs; tÞ 2 L h;q by the following formulas:
The resulting vector ðs; tÞ is sufficiently close to m ¼ ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ, namely this is a solution of CVSP for m. 5. OUTPUT: Output the first entry s as a signature for the input message D.
Verification Algorithm. The verifier examines whether or not the signature s is a valid signature for the message D. 
where k Á k denotes the centered norm. 5. OUTPUT: Output ''accept'' if r B, and output ''reject'' if otherwise.
Note that signing for a message D is to compute a lattice point in the neighborhood of the hashed message vector m ¼ ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ of D within the radius B, namely to solve CVSP in the NTRU lattices using the round off method [2] . The round off method requires a basis whose norm is small to obtain a solution which is close to a given target vector. Therefore, it is necessary that the norms of the private basis vectors ð f ; gÞ and ðF; GÞ are sufficiently small in order to efficiently solve CVSP in the NTRU lattices using this method [6, 7] . The signing algorithm is described by the following matrix formula:
A signer thus uses his private basis fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg to solve CVSP in the NTRU lattices. If the norm bound parameter B is getting smaller, then a forgery without any information on the private key is to be harder. The designers of NTRUSign recommend the system parameters ðN; q; d f ; d g ; BÞ should be ð251; 128; 73; 71; 310Þ in order to achieve almost the same security level as RSA-1024 [7] . The complexity of finding the private key f ; g from the public key h is the combination number ð n d f Þ. Using the recommended parameters presented above, the complexity is estimated at 2 203 .
Transcript Attack [4]
It has been known that there is vulnerability in the security of NTRUSign, namely there is an attack for NTRUSign called the transcript attack [4] . In this section, we illustrate how the transcript attack for NTRUSign works.
A transcript is a set of pairs ðm; sÞ of a hashed message vector m ¼ ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ and a signature s. The transcript attack is to get partial information of the private key using the second and forth moments described below. For a hashed message vector ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ 2 R 2 and its signature s, by Eqs. (8) and (9) the difference m 1 À s is of the form
where X and x are polynomials of degree at most N À 1 with integral coefficients, " 1 and " 2 are polynomials of degree at most N À 1 with rational coefficients, and all coefficients of " 1 and " 2 belong to the interval ½À1=2; 1=2. If the transcript is of sufficiently large size, the coefficients of " 1 and " 2 for each of the entries m 1 À s will uniformly distribute in the interval ½À1=2; 1=2, i.e. the entries m 1 À s will uniformly distribute in the unit parallelepiped of the lattice whose center is the origin. The average of the differences over the transcript yields no information that is useful for attackers because the average will vanish. However, some useful information is revealed from the transcript using higher degree moments. For a polynomial cðXÞ, its reversal c cðXÞ is defined by c cðXÞ ¼ cðX À1 Þ. The product b c cðXÞ ¼ cðXÞ Á c cðXÞ is called the second moment of cðXÞ. The square b c cðXÞ 2 of the second moment is called the fourth moment of cðXÞ. The transcript attacks using the second moment and the fourth moment are called the second moment attack and the fourth moment attack, respectively.
The second moment of the difference m 1 À s is of the form
The averages of b " 1 " 1 and b " 2 " 2 over the transcript tend to some fixed polynomials respectively and the averages of the other terms tend to zero as the transcript is getting larger. Hence, by averaging the second moments over a sufficiently long transcript, we obtain the average value
The average value Ave is quite essential information to guess the shape of the unit parallelepiped. Therefore, this value Ave reveals some partial information on the private key f and F. However, there is no known efficient algorithm for completely finding the private key f and F from the average value Ave. The combination of the second moment attack and the fourth moment attack will be successful in order to extract the complete private key from the transcript. The fourth moment attack requires a transcript of enormously larger size rather than the second moment attack. If an attacker obtains a transcript of sufficiently large size, then he will obtain an average value Ave 0 by averaging the fourth moments of the differences m 1 À s in the transcript as we have done in Eq. (14). Combining the average Ave 0 with the average value Ave in Eq. (14), he could efficiently obtain the private key [4, 6, 7] . Hoffstein et al. suggest by numerical experiments that the second moment attack will need a transcript of size at least 10 4 under the recommended parameters ðN; q; d f ; d g ; BÞ ¼ ð251; 128; 73; 71; 310Þ, and the fourth moment attack will need a transcript of size at least 10 8 under the recommended parameters [6, 7] .
A Countermeasure against the Transcript Attack
In this section we present a countermeasure for protecting NTRUSign against the second moment attack and analyze its efficacy.
Improved NTRUSign algorithm
The strategy of our countermeasure is outlined as follows. The transcript attack requires a transcript in which there are sufficiently many entries that come from the pairs of the hashed message and its signature generated by a single private key. A signer therefore updates his current private key to a new one without changing the corresponding public key before the number of signatures generated by the current private key reaches the number required for the transcript attack. The transcript attack would then fail because attackers cannot obtain sufficiently many transcript entries generated by a single private key. The perturbation technique aims to blur the shape of the unit parallepiped spanned by the private basis of NTRU lattice, while our countermeasure is to prevent the attacker from obtaining any meaningful information on the shape of the parallepiped by disturbing to implement the second moment attack.
In order to protect NTRUSign against the transcript attack, we newly add the key updating algorithm described below and two private parameters C sig and B sig . C sig is to be used as a counter of signature generation, and B sig is an upper bound for C sig .
Key Updating Algorithm. A signer updates his private key fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg to a new one fðf ; gÞ; ðF 0 ; G 0 Þg without changing the corresponding public key h. The signer increments the counter C sig by one whenever he generates a signature with the current private key. If the counter C sig exceeds the bound B sig , then the signer should update his private key by the key updating algorithm and initialize C sig as C sig ¼ 0. The bound B sig should be set so that the transcript attack does not succeed using less than B sig transcript entries generated by a single private key. Note that the counter C sig and the bound B sig should be kept in secret, namely only the signer should know them. The input parameter B K is an upper bound on the norm of newly created basis vectors ðF 0 ; G 0 Þ. The norm of the private key of NTRUSign should be sufficiently small in order to efficiently solve CVSP in the NTRU lattice. B K should be set sufficiently small so that fðf ; gÞ; ðF 0 ; G 0 Þg can be used for a new private key whenever kðF 0 ; G 0 Þk B K . Using the recommended parameters ðN; q; d f ; d g Þ ¼ ð251; 128; 73; 71Þ, it is estimated that B K ¼ 45 [7] .
The algorithm fails to output a new private key if B K is too small and it halts at (b) of Step 4. While, if the algorithm outputs a key fðf ; gÞ; ðF 0 ; G 0 Þg at Step 5, then the output is a private key corresponding to the public key h. This fact directly follows from Lemma 4 and Proposition 5 below.
Lemma 4 ([7]). Let f 2 R
Ã and g; h; F; G 2 R satisfy f Ã G À g Ã F ¼ q and h f À1 Ã g (mod qÞ, and let L h;q be the NTRU lattice by h and q. Then the following (a) and (b) hold:
(a) fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg is an R-basis of L h;q ; and
Proposition 5. Let f 2 R Ã and g; h; F; G 2 R satisfy f Ã G À g Ã F ¼ q and h f À1 Ã g (mod qÞ, and let L h;q be the NTRU lattice by h and q. For any c 2 R, let
From Lemma 4, fðf ; gÞ; ðF 0 ; G 0 Þg is an R-basis of L h;q . Ã If kðF; GÞk is sufficiently small, then for the polynomials
; G 0 Þk tends to be small since kX i k is small. If kðF 0 ; G 0 Þk is sufficiently small, then a key fðf ; gÞ; ðF 0 ; G 0 Þg could be used for a new private key corresponding to the public key h. Therefore, the algorithm seems to output a new private key in many cases.
Efficacy of the countermeasure
We next discuss the efficacy of our countermeasure against the second moment attack. For any private key K ¼ fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg, we denote by T K the transcript consisting of all possible pairs ðm; sÞ, where m ¼ ðm 1 ; m 2 Þ is a hashed message and s is the corresponding signature of m by K. By Eq. (12), for each transcript entry ððm 1i ; m 2i Þ; s i Þ 2 T K , the difference w i ¼ m 1i À s i is of the form
and its second moment b w w i is given by
If the attacker has a transcript T T K , then by averaging the second moments over all entries in T, he obtains
where
While, averaging over T K yields a value of the form
For a positive number " > 0, we say that A 2 ðTÞ is an "-approximation of A 2 ðT K Þ if the following four inequalities hold:
F Fj "; and (4) j" 4T Ã f f Ã Fj ". We say that an attacker succeeds in an error " if he obtains an "-approximation A 2 ðTÞ of A 2 ðT K Þ by using a transcript T T K . If the attacker succeeds in sufficiently small error ", then he could compute the private key K by using the approximation value A 2 ðTÞ as we have mentioned in Section 3. Therefore, we shall prevent the attacker from succeeding in a small error ".
Assume that the private key is updated from the current one K ¼ fðf ; gÞ; ðF; GÞg to a new one K 0 ¼ fðf ; gÞ; ðF 0 ; G 0 Þg by using the Key Updating Algorithm, where 
and its second moment is
If the attacker has a transcript T 0 T K 0 , then by averaging the second moments over T 0 , he obtains
Similarly to A 2 ðT K Þ, averaging over T K 0 yields the value
Let " > 0. We denote by M " ðKÞ the minimum size of a transcript T T K such that A 2 ðTÞ is an "-approximation of A 2 ðT K Þ. M " ðK 0 Þ is similarly defined. Let M ¼ minfM " ðKÞ; M " ðK 0 Þg. Assume that the attacker has a transcript T T K [ T K 0 of size M such that T \ T K 6 ¼ ; and T \ T K 0 6 ¼ ;, and he is now going to execute the second moment attack using the transcript T. His goal is to get an "-approximation value of either A 2 ðT K Þ or A 2 ðT K 0 Þ. By averaging the second moment over T, he will obtain
The attacker has sufficiently many transcript entries for finding the shared terms (17) and (23). For these terms, the attacker may therefore obtain "-approximations of them. However, it is hard for the attacker to distinguish these terms from the remaining terms in Eqs. (17) and (23). While, the other terms in Eq. (26) appear only in Eq. (23). Since T \ T K 6 ¼ ;, jT \ T K 0 j < M and hence it follows from the definition of M that the attacker cannot obtain "-approximations of these other terms. Hence he fails to attack. We thus have the following theorem. If the attacker uses a transcript generated by only K, then he needs a transcript of size at least M " ðKÞ to obtain an "-approximation of A 2 ðT K Þ. Similarly, he needs a transcript of size at least M " ðK 0 Þ if he uses a transcript by only K 0 . Theorem 6 implies that NTRUSign with our countermeasure is strong at least as the same level as the original NTRUSign against the transcript attack, say the transcript attack never succeeds in an error " even if he uses a transcript of size M generated by both the original key K and the new key K 0 . If the private key is updated n times, say K 0 ; . . . ; K n , then the attacker needs at least M " ðK i Þ transcript entries for each K i . Even if T K i and T K j ði 6 ¼ jÞ have the same transcript entry, the information obtained from the transcript entry changes depending on the transcript which the entry belongs. Hence we consider that for i; j 2 f0; . . . ; ng, i 6 ¼ j, T K i and T K j are disjoint in this sense. Therefore the attacker requires at least P n i¼0 M " ðK i Þ entries to obtain an "-approximation for any one of A 2 ðT K i Þ, i ¼ 0; . . . ; n. In practice, the bound B sig should be set so that no attacker succeeds the second moment attack, namely B sig < M " ðK i Þ for each i ¼ 0; . . . ; n. Consequently, our countermeasure increases the number of signatures that can be safely generated from B sig to ðn þ 1ÞB sig .
If the attacker executes the second moment attack for the improved NTRUSign by using a transcript T S n i¼0 T K i , then he will obtain the average value
However, no one but the signer knows when the private key is updated and what the new private key is, because those are kept in secret by the signer. Furthermore, there is no known efficient algorithm to find each average A 2 ðT K i Þ from the given values Eq. (27) and n. Therefore, even if the attacker knows the value n, it is hard for him to obtain each of the average values A 2 ðT K i Þ. Hence it seems to be hard for attackers to extract useful information from Eq. (27) even if they succeed the second moment attack. The similar argument can be applied to the fourth moment attack. Furthermore, the efficient algorithm for recovering the private key, mentioned in Section 3, is useless for the improved NTRUSign.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we propose a countermeasure for protecting NTRUSign against the transcript attack, and discuss its efficacy. While the perturbation technique blurs the shape of the unit parallelepiped of the lattice which an attacker would obtain by the second moment attack, our countermeasure prevents the attacker from implementing the second moment atatck, by updating a private key before a signer generates sufficiently many signatures required for the second moment attack by the current private key. We verified that the improved NTRUSign is strong at least as the same level as the original one against the second moment attack. In practice, our countermeasure increases the number of signatures that can be safely generated by constant times than the original NTRUSign. Furthermore, the efficient algorithm for recovering the private key using the second moment and the fourth moment does not work well by our countermeasure. However, our countermeasure cannot prevent the attacker for efficiently finding the previous private key if he obtains the latest private key. In other words, the improved NTRUSign does not have the forward security. (For the forward security of signature schemes, see Bellare-Miner Scheme [3] .) Improving NTRUSign so that the resulting scheme has the forward security is an interesting open problem. Although we present a countermeasure based on the key updating technique, we do not show how we determine in practice the norm bound of private key K and the signature generation bound B sig used in the key updating algorithm. In addition, we do not know any formula giving the number M of signatures that can be safely generated by a single private key, although some numerical experiments show that M $ 10 4 for the second moment attack and M $ 10 8 for the fourth moment attack. Analyzing such parameters is one of the significant open problems.
